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Logos and logic are familiar themes with Heidegger. The relation between the 
two was foundational to his early thinking that led up to the publication of Sein 
und Zeit (Being and Time).1 Following its publication, logos, in particular, anchors 
or at least informs key concepts of ontology, truth, language and poetry found 
throughout his work. Further, logic and logos as concepts are critical to gaining 
an understanding of his distinction of pre-Socratic and post-Platonic thinking 
and his effort to return to and disclose a more “originary” thinking that 
becomes lost in philosophy’s turn toward metaphysics. Along the path of this 
process, Heidegger’s 1943 and 1944 lectures on Heraclitus find him at a midway 
point in his thinking on these two terms, translated here to English for the first 
time by Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen as Heraclitus: The 
Inception of  Occidental Thinking & Logic: Heraclitus’s Doctrine of  the Logos.2 
Heraclitus’ logos (λογ́ος) has been endlessly interpreted, translated and 
appropriated to advance core concepts in Stoicism, Christianity and 
contemporary continental philosophy. The word remains as vital as ever in 
philosophical discourse. Yet today’s post-structuralist usage often points 
 
1 See, for example, in English, Heidegger’s Logic: The Question of Truth, which is compiled from his 1925-26 
lectures in Marburg. See as well his History of the Concept of Time, from 1925. 
2 Full citation: Martin Heidegger, Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking and Logic: Heraclitus’s Doctrine 
of the Logos, trans. Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 
2018. All parenthetical references to page numbers are taken from this source. 
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dismissively to a fixed, a priori, near inescapable dogma. Heidegger’s aim with 
logos and logic was to return to their abandoned Greek sense, to open to their 
fluidity and openness. By revisiting the terms, he offers a speculative revisitation 
to a different kind of thinking, one that is inconceivable today. Opening to the 
word logos opens to thought that no longer exists, but which for Heidegger 
should re-enter contemporary discourse to reorient our thinking of being, 
language, listening, poetry and philosophical practice. Problems of the 
commonness of thought and the thinking that does not think are ethically 
aligned in Heraclitus and Heidegger. The book is valuable therefore for 
scholars of Heidegger, Heraclitus and pre-Socratic philosophy, but as well for 
those working toward reorienting familiar and unchallenged thinking about 
logos and logic. 
Specifically in regard to Heidegger’s work, there are two distinct aspects to 
this text to identify for the purposes of review. First, simply, is that that these 
lectures illustrate Heidegger’s thinking at this time on these concepts. Second, 
and worth deeper scrutiny, is that Heidegger’s attempt here is to act as teacher 
toward understanding not only these concepts but Heraclitus’ thinking in the 
latter’s own time. While this is an impossible task, as he admits, it is nevertheless 
an effort to attend to and unfold Heraclitus’s project, as distinct from the 
application of such terms through Aristotle, Kant, Hegel or others. Along this 
journey, Heidegger both aims toward the “inception of” Occidental thinking 
while also marking a distinction between inceptual and Occidental thought. 
The latter, developed through Plato and Aristotle, is what became metaphysics 
and what we now think of as philosophy. Its influence today is Aristotelian but 
mostly taken up in the aftermath of Kant and the Enlightenment. “The 
Occidental definition of the essence of the human should be recalled: ζῷον 
λογ́ον ἐχ́ον, animal rationale, the rational living being…” (19). Its modern 
aims, process and method are entirely different from the inceptual thinking that 
gave birth to it. Inceptual thinking is “originary” thinking, and for Heidegger, 
only three Greek thinkers can lay claim to the inception of Occidental thought at 
its origin: Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus (4).3 Because his thinking is 
 
3 “Inceptual thinking” is translated from the German as anfängliche/anfängliches/anfänglich (Denken). His use 
echoes his earlier Contributions to Philosophy, in which he describes inceptual thinking as a leap away from 
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inceptual, and because we today (the 1940s in this case) live in an Occidental 
age, Heraclitus’ cosmology, ethics and use of language is so difficult to think. 
Logic is an example of this historical process. It is a core term to grasp in 
this text, not only as a distinction of inceptual thinking and Occidental 
metaphysics but in its relation to logos. “‘Logic’ is originary when it consists of 
the thinking ‘of the’ Λογ́ος…” (139). Logic becomes metaphysics through 
Hegel’s system, and, at the point of Heidegger’s lectures, is expressed in 
definitions such as “correct thinking,” or thinking correctly about “the 
structure, form and rules of thinking” and applying them to other situations; 
logic is necessitated therefore on consistency, a correspondence to logic (143). 
Heidegger’s argument is that this Occidental logic is not relational to thinking 
but in correspondence to matter, situation or process. This is how one comes to 
apply the word logic to some natural thing. To better our thinking, we 
therefore need to get out of the structure of logic and its rules. “Many a person 
seemingly possesses ‘logic,’ but still never thinks a single truthful thought” (143). 
His critique here is of the whole modern system of logic and how it comes to 
function as the dominant mode of thinking, laying claim over our thought of 
things in the world. In logic there is the logic of thinking and the logic of things. 
He wants to examine the former, but the problem of logic is that it is already 
beholden in Occidental thought to the latter. In this sense, logic adheres 
entirely to pre-existent structures. Any claim of logic is pre-figured in 
accordance to consistency, not thinking. This is a useful method for achieving 
such consistency in making a point or a claim in applying its structure to a 
particular situation, but it belongs fundamentally to things. Heidegger wants, in 
part, to free thought from such a correspondence so one can think in a more 
originary way.  
This leads him back to the etymology. Prior to “logic” there was “logos,” 
and out of that became logic. His effort then is to go back to logos to attempt a 
thinking-through of what Heraclitus was thinking, which is an originary or 
inceptual way of thinking rather than the Occidental, metaphysical thinking we 
have now in philosophy. “More truthful” would then be more “originary,” as 
 
the world of beings/representation/appearances toward the openness of historical-be-ing as another 
beginning. 
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in, prior to “logic.” But in his speaking on logic, truth does not yet enter the 
picture. Instead the emphasis is on an activity that is more authentic in that it is 
a “letting be,” an unfolding “of being out from its own truth” (177). Logic’s 
originary connection to logos “is essentially without doctrinal content,” rather 
“the unceasing practice of—or perhaps even just the preparation for—taking a 
simple step in one’s thinking into the realm of the authentic to-be-thought” 
(177). This is not a thinking that thinks in a vacuum but one that is a gathering 
of what is, a “harvesting” of thought. Heidegger, here and in other works, is 
fond of such agrarian terms in his account of logos, something he acknowledges. 
Logos is an older practice, more rural, lying outside of the structures of 
academia and instead a thought given to the phusis or nature that emerges 
through “unconcealment.” In an originary manner, logic “is the shortened 
expression for ἐπιστημ́η λογικη,́ and now means: having an understanding of 
what pertains to λογ́ος” (156). Such a move toward what is originary in 
Heraclitus is also original (in the sense of new) in Heidegger, in that such an 
exercise does not conform to any system (logic) but is a gathering of being 
(logos). Inception logic is “deeper” than the logic we have post-Aristotle:  
“the essence of λογ́ος must be thought the deepest in ‘logic,’ especially if the 
latter is the metaphysics of λογ́ος. Seen in this way, pre-Platonic thinking 
becomes pre-metaphysical thinking, the kind of thinking that is still incomplete 
and is still on its way toward metaphysics. What the pre-Platonic thinkers said 
about λογ́ος can only be thought from out of later metaphysics. This is the 
situation that came to pass, and it is still happening now.” (196-197) 
Inceptual thinking as originary is also placed counter to “common” 
thinking. The “rubbish” of the cosmos in Frag. 50 is what Heraclitus means by 
common thought (124). Heidegger also phrases the distinction as one of 
essential versus conventional thinking, of which Heraclitus was well aware. 
Essence, while incomprehensible to conventional thinking, is not necessarily 
complicated, rather it is too simple. It is not too distant but too near. Essence is 
conceived not as an end but as a “sojourn” that does not move but listens to 
what is unsaid in the saying (135). “This sojourn presupposes a place whose 
place-ness is not easily found by the human. That is why he must set out to seek 
for, and inquire about, this place of its essence” (256). Heraclitus is known as 
“The Obscure” not because he was intentionally trying to hide, Heidegger 
states, but because obscurity is necessary to preserve the essence within any 
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saying. In other words, concealment is necessary for inceptual thinking. 
Darkness is needed to give contour to the light. 
Many of the terms already mentioned are familiar to readers of Heidegger. 
He retraces many of his paths in his lectures here, but it is worth highlighting 
four concepts to gain a sense of the direction he is moving in this connection of 
logic and logos in the inceptual versus Occidental worldviews. The first two, 
arguably the two most central concepts to Heidegger’s project, must be kept in 
mind when reading this text: his ontology (the Being of beings) and his 
epistemology (truth as aletheia). Aletheia (ἀληθ́εια) is often translated directly as 
truth but this is not quite accurate, as Heidegger says. It is “revealing into 
unconcealment” that is “thought in the saying, though it is not named in it” 
(130). When aletheia speaks, it is speaking inceptually. Necessary to illustrate 
these core concepts are the two additional Greek terms worth highlighting: 
phusis (φυσ́ις, nature) and ethos (ἦθος, ethics). Heidegger and Heraclitus agree 
that nature prefers to hide, as we read famously in Frag. 123. For Heraclitus, 
nature comes through in signs and as logos; for Heidegger, Being, as nature, 
comes through aletheia in its unconcealment, and this is its truth revealed as 
visual. Truth in this sense must be drawn out because it hides in a concealment 
within sheltering. Nature, Heidegger says, is a bad translation for phusis; it is 
rather emerging to appearance (20). But such emergence requires creation 
(τεχ́νη, technē) to be made visual and known. This is not mere appearance but 
what is inconspicuous in all things that do appear—as he phrases it, in “the 
inconspicuous shining” (109). Conventional thinking cannot see phusis because 
today we are directed toward objects, measuring what can be objectified. Phusis 
can only be thought inceptually. It is not invisible, rather “it is what is seen 
inceptually which, however, is for the most part never properly beheld” (109). If 
nature hides, it is from the eyes of humans. Phusis doesn’t need to hide since 
human ignorance will keep it hidden. Regarding ethos, Heidegger wonders if 
logos and ethos are not involved in the same process. Ethics is, as he defines it, 
the human in a relation to the whole of being. Could the same be applied to 
logos? He responds that the difference is that logos is always caught up in a 
particular activity, a particular harvesting, while ethics is done in regard to 
one’s relation of the whole of humanity. Logic, then, is more about ethos than 
logos because it is the whole that is applied to a situation: “logic is the ethics of 
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λογ́ος, the ethics of asserting” (164). 
How does all this happen, this revealing through nature’s concealment? 
Through logos. But logos, as relational, requires action or activity. This is where 
legein (λεγ́ειν) steps in conceptually. It is the activity of logos, bound as the two are 
within thinking, or that which gathers—the harvesting as the verb of logos, the 
harvest. Heidegger states it quite simply in his summary with the following: 
“λογ́ος/λεγ́ειν is harvest/to harvest, gathering/to gather” (281).4 Out of the 
logos relation, something comes into thought; this something is the activity. It is 
not simply the action, but that the process becomes actualized. For Heidegger, 
what becomes actualized is thought in a visual sense; truth as aletheia is an 
emergence into light. 
In this familiar Heideggerian emphasis on vision and light, it is easy to 
forget that logos involves an act of listening. Heidegger acknowledges this in his 
deep study of Heraclitus’ famous Frag. 50, commonly translated to English as 
“Listening not to me but to the logos, it is wise to say that all things are one.” 
But Heidegger does his own fragment translations throughout the text, which 
are then translated from German to English for this edition. In so doing, he 
necessarily complicates the issue to help us think through the fragment in a new 
way (that is to say, an older, more inceptual approach). Frag. 50 through 
Heidegger then becomes: “If you have listened not merely to me, but rather 
have listened to the Logos (in obedience to it, hearkening to it), then knowledge 
(which subsists therein) is to say the same as the Logos: one is all.” (187) There is 
a criticism to be found here in Heidegger: that understanding obeys what is 
prior to the act, that one’s logos activity attunes to the logos that is. This hearing-
as-obeying aspect is a refrain for Heidegger. It appears not only in this text, but 
in a lecture devoted to the same fragment in 1950.5 For Heidegger, then, logos 
leads to obedience, an obedience to logos—in other words, to Being, to what is. 
The move he has made therefore is to inject “is” into Heraclitus’ paradox. This 
reminds us that Heidegger is continuing his project of a return to ontology, a 
turning toward being. This is further illustrated in the distinction between logos 
and the logos, which Heidegger spends considerable time working through. The 
 
4 See also 203. 
5 See the text Early Greek Thinking. 
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first is a human process and thereby aligned with Aristotelian interpretations; 
the second is more difficult to ascertain, not only because this is the “originary” 
aspect as Being or Beying for Heidegger, but also because it lies both with the 
world and the human who listens. 
As in common with Heidegger, his process circles around a core concept—
in this case the connection of an originary logic and logos—and slowly 
penetrates toward the question. The question penetrated here, in suggestions 
and foreshadowing, is: what is logos? Heidegger reminds us that Heraclitus 
never says what it is. Indeed, the core of the concept is that one cannot say. For 
Heidegger, it lies in the relation itself, in one being caught up in preserving a 
disclosure of nature that has no matter. It is the journey, the conversation, the 
act of preserving; it is the most difficult bearing without grasping what offers no 
guarantee of a correspondence. “Even when humans listen with their ears, it is 
not guaranteed that they have listened to what they have heard, and that they 
have gathered themselves toward it in a hearkening way” (297).  
As much as Heidegger wishes to seek out the Heraclitus that has been 
forgotten, what one finds in reading his account is Heidegger’s own thought in 
the process of being thought, or rather re-thought. This is indeed the value of 
the work. Of interest to scholars here is in assessing from the text the degree to 
which Heidegger has disclosed an inceptual thinking of Heraclitus against the 
degree to which Heidegger is appropriating Heraclitus toward illustrating and 
enlivening Heidegger’s own work. This is not to suggest an either/or, for there 
is indeed overlap here in the topics, terms and their interrelations explored. But 
it should not be forgotten that in this period of Heidegger’s life, the question of 
logos here is answered in a way that functions for his project: an inceptual logos 
is, to Heidegger, a relation not only to, but of, Being. Everything stated in these 
lectures and documented as the text cycles back toward this fundamental thesis. 
As with so much of Heidegger’s work during this period—he was forbidden 
by the Nazi party from publishing and what we have of this time are lectures—
to review the book is to review his speaking notes gathered into a book, which 
are then translated to and edited into this English edition. One should keep in 
mind therefore that in this book is Heidegger’s literally unorthodox translations of 
Greek fragments, presumably taken from “inceptual” Heraclitean thinking, 
into German, which are then translated here to English. The aim of the book is 
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express the inexpressible in language, a radical and speculative synchronic 
investigation translated and re-translated. One may then fairly question the 
value of the effort and its place in English philosophical scholarship as it pushes 
forward. Nevertheless, this could be said of many translations and works 
regarding ancient philosophy and incomplete works, of Heraclitus’ own for 
example. The interpretation, the work of translation, becomes a fertile exercise 
that opens to thought that is difficult to know. This should not be taken as a 
dismissal—for the text is a fascinating and thorough investigation of the 
untranslatable—but in fact opens to new discussions. 
Regarding the structure of the book, there is the familiar “Translator’s 
Forward.” But sorely missing is a longer, proper introduction. Overviews of 
Heidegger’s thought are perhaps redundant for a text like this, unlikely as it is 
to be a reader’s introduction to his work. But this text in particular, this series 
of lectures, needs to be placed in its time. His development of thought over the 
years on the core concepts of logos and logic are key to introducing the subject 
matter. Heidegger’s concept in logos experienced important growth and 
rethinking between the years of 1925-1952 in particular and revisited in depth 
again in ’67-68. It is mentioned in early sections of Being and Time and 
developed more fully in Was Heisst Denken. But texts and lectures before, after 
and in between these two famous books deserve to be situated for the reader to 
offer a sense of this evolution. A second aspect of the text worth mentioning is 
how Heidegger’s own arrangement of his lectures repeats itself. This may be 
redundant for some readers and helpful for others. Noted in the text are 
“Review” sections for some, but not all, lectures. Heidegger additionally 
provides a brief summary at the end of the third lecture. Finally, there is the 
decision to include at the end a “first draft” of a supplement Heidegger wrote 
as a continuation of these lectures. This should not be ignored as it is 
interesting to see how once again he has consolidated, clarified and rephrased 
many of the key topics and terms explored. 
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